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He Who Laughs Last: Will Missouri's
Attempt to Crack Down on Managed Care
Entities Survive ERISA Preemption?
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1997, Missouri enacted sweeping legislation which subjects
managed care entities to extensive regulation and liability. As with all health
care reform efforts at the state level, preemption by the Employee Retirement
Income and Security Act of 1974' (ERISA) is a serious concern. This Law
Summary analyzes prior caselaw regarding ERISA preemption of state
initiatives, details the Missouri regulatory scheme and describes the issues that
will arise when the courts determine ERISA preemption of the Missouri plan.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. EPSA Preemptionof State Law RegardingHMOs
ERISA is the primary federal law governing employee benefits. The statute
does not require that employers provide certain minimal benefits, but rather
focuses on the administration of such benefit plans.2 ERISA preemption of state
law causes of action is broad in scope.3 Preemption occurs when a state law
"relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan.4 A "savings clause" prevents ERISA
from preempting a state law regulating insurance.5 The "deemer clause"
prevents states from labeling an employee benefit plan as an insurance plan to
avoid preemption.6
ERISA preemption is important in the health care context because
recoveries under the federal statute are limited to the amount of the benefit the
HMO should have provided.7 In other words, neither extra-contractual

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
2. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 651 (1995).
3. Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Conn. 1990).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). A state law regulates insurance when: (1) it
has the effect of transferring or spreading the policyholder's risk; (2) it is an integral part
of the policy relationship between the insured and the insurer; (3) it is limited to entities
within the insurance industry. United of Omaha v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of
Am., 104 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 1997).

United of Omaha is interesting because, after

finding that the statute in question related to employee benefit plans but was saved by the
insurance savings clause, the court went on to examine whether the statute conflicted
with ERISA. Id. at 1041.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
7. L. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can'tGet There From Here-Questioningthe Erosion
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compensatory nor punitive damages are recoverable under the statute.
Furthermore, jury trials are disallowed under ERISA.8 Preemption virtually
disallows the traditional medical malpractice action.
ERISA preemption ensures that benefit plans and their employer-sponsors
are subject to a uniform body of benefits law.9 Uniformity minimizes both the
administrative and financial burden of compliance with conflicting state
directives.'0 "Otherwise, the inefficiencies created could work to the detriment
of plan beneficiaries."" Statutes or common law causes of action that subject
employee benefit plans to inconsistent regulatory schemes are "consistently held
pre-empted" because they increase inefficiency and may cause employers to
respond by reducing the level of benefits. 2
Regarding the vicarious and direct liability of HMOs, courts have varied in
their treatment of ERISA preemption. 3 Some jurisdictions have taken the
position that ERISA preempts both types of claims. 4 One court argued that to
hold otherwise (direct claims preempted; vicarious claims not preempted) would
result in HMOs facing less liability as their role in the treatment of patients
increased." Because direct claims will be preempted, and direct claims involve
the actions of the managed care organization more than vicarious claims, ERISA
preemption should correlate with the extent of its involvement in providing
treatment. Additionally, it has been argued that to allow vicarious claims to
proceed in state courts would result in HMOs being forced to purchase
malpractice insurance. 6 The cost of this insurance, it has been argued, would
result in "higher costs that certainly trickle down to plan beneficiaries."' 7
Other jurisdictions have taken the approach that only claims of direct
negligence by the HMO will result in preemption." In Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., the Fifth Circuit made the distinction between a medical

of ERISA Preemptionin Medical MalpracticeActions Against HMOs, 30 GA. L. REV.

1023, 1036 (1996).
8. Id.

9. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th Cir. 1992).
13. Claims arising solely from the negligence of a provider (doctor, nurse, etc.) are
considered "vicarious," while claims arising from some action or inaction of the managed
care organization (MCO) are termed "direct" for purposes of this Law Summary.
14. Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F.
Supp. 316, 317 (D.N.J. 1993); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, 753 F. Supp. 61, 62 (D.
Conn. 1990).
15. Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 318.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Pacificare v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Corcoran v. United

Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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decision and a benefit decision.' 9 Corcoraninvolved a suit against a utilization
review provider.2 ° If utilization review were deemed a medical decision, state
law would more likely govern, while a benefit decision would more likely be
preempted by ERISA.2" The court held that utilization review was a "medical
decision incident to a benefit determination," and the cause of action must be
preempted.'
The Corcoran court noted that Congress' goal in passing ERISA was
uniformity of benefit law among the states.' While holding utilization review
entities directly liable might "deter[] poor quality medical decisions, there is a
significant risk that state liability rules would be applied differently to the
conduct of utilization review companies in different states." 24 In the Fifth
Circuit's view, preemption also was justified by the fact that the goal of
utilization review was cost containment.2 5 Cost containment relates to the
objective of uniformity among plans offered in the various states.
The Eighth Circuit also has addressed the issue of direct HMO liability. In
Kuhl v. Lincoln NationalHealth Plan of Kansas City, Inc., the court was faced
with a plan beneficiary who was denied treatment by the plan administrator.26
The plaintiff tried to characterize the actions of the administrator as giving
medical opinions regarding the necessity of the treatment.27 The court rejected
this argument, stating that the defendant was accused of merely improperly
processing the plaintiff's claim.28 Because ERISA contains its own provisions
for the recovery of benefits due under a plan, the claim was preempted.29
Courts have varied in their treatment of ERISA preemption of state laws
that affect the "structure" of a benefit plan. The United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue in New York State Conference ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield
Plansv. Travelers InsuranceCo.3" In Travelers, New York placed a surcharge
on hospital rates for patients with commercial insurance, while patients with
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans which offer open enrollment3' were not subject

19. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1329.
20. Id., at 1323. Utilization review is an external evaluation based on clinical
criteria conducted by third-party payors or health care organizers to evaluate the
appropriateness of medical care in a given situation. Id. (citing John D. Blum, An
Analysis ofLegal Liability in Health Care UtilizationReview & Case Management, 26
Hous. L. REv 191, 192-93 (1989)).
21. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1329.
22. Id. at 1331.
23. Id. at 1333.
24. Id.
25. Id. atn.16.
26. 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993).
27. Id. at 302.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 303.
30. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
31. Open enrollment provides coverage for all who seek it. The Blue Cross-Blue
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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to the surcharge.32 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that ERISA
preempted the surcharge because the surcharge interfered with the choices that
ERISA plans make in choosing health coverage.3"
The Supreme Court began its analysis by determining whether the
surcharge related to employee benefit plans.34 Agreeing that the surcharge had
an indirect economic effect on choices made by ERISA plans, the Court then
addressed whether the economic effect of the surcharges should result in
preemption.3 5 The Court found that ERISA did not indicate congressional intent
to displace state health care regulation, which had been a matter of local concern
historically. 36 Furthermore, the Court stated that "cost-uniformity was almost
certainly not an object of pre-emption."3 7
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the Court had held
that a state law requiring all insurers to carry mental health benefits related to
ERISA plans.33 In Travelers,the Court distinguished MetropolitanLife because
the surcharges involved in the former case did not impose the substantive
coverage requirements that the Massachusetts statute did.39 Because the
surcharges did not require the ERISA plans to insure "against an entire category
of illnesses they might otherwise choose to leave without coverage," and because
cost-uniformity was not a goal of ERISA preemption, the surcharges did not
relate to employee benefit plans.'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the "structure" preemption
issue in CIGNA HealthplanofLouisiana,Inc. v. Ieyoub.4 1 In this post-Travelers
decision, Louisiana had passed an "any willing provider" statute. 42 The statute
provided that preferred provider organizations (PPOs)-arrangements between
insurance purchasers and health care providers whereby the purchasers use a
select group of providers in return for discounted services-must accept any

Shield plans bear the costs of many patients the commercial insurers would reject. Id.
at 658.
32. Id.
33. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'd, 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
34. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
35. Id. at 660.
36. Id. at 661.
37. Id. at 662.
38. 471 U.S. 724 (1985). ERISA preemption was nonetheless avoided in
MetropolitanLife due to the insurance savings clause. Id. at 740.
39. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 664 (1995).
40. Id.
41. 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
42. Id. at 645.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/6
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health care provider who agrees to abide by the terms of the PPO arrangement. 43
Louisiana provided for the formation of PPOs by statute. 44
The Fifth Circuit observed that "ERISA preempts 'state laws that mandat[e]
employee benefit structures or their administration."' 4

The court held that the

"cany willing provider" statute related to ERISA plans because the Louisiana
statute authorizing the formation of PPOs included ERISA plans as potential
purchasers of the PPO service.' In other words, Louisiana prevents ERISA
plans from purchasing PPOs that do not include any willing provider.47 "By
denying insurers, employers, and HMOs the right to structure their benefits in
a particular manner, the statute is effectively requiring ERISA plans to purchase
benefits of a particular structure when they contract with Connecticut General
Life Insurance Company (CIGNA)." ' " The Louisiana scheme did not benefit
from the insurance savings clause because it provided that self-funded groups,
in addition to insurers, were subject to the PPO and any willing provider
provisions.49

B. MissouriManagedCareLiability
Missouri courts have had few opportunities to address the issue of managed
care liability. In Harrellv. Total Health Care,Inc.,"° the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant HMO was negligent in failing to investigate the credentials or
reputation of one of its participating physicians."1 The cause of action was
labeled as one of corporate negligence resting on the HMO's non-delegable duty
to carefully select physicians.52 Because the physician in question was the object
of numerous claims of medical malpractice, and Total Health Care made no
investigation of the physician's competence, the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District held that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for
corporate negligence. 3 The court observed that the common law duty to
investigate the physicians resulted from the unreasonable risk of harn that could

43. Id.
44, Id. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.2201 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).

45. Ieyoub, 82 F.3d at 647 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658).
46. Id. at 648.

47. Id.
48. Id
49. Id. at 649.

50. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., No. WD 39809, 1989 WL 153066 (Mo. Ct.
App. Apr. 25, 1989)
51. Id. at *3.

52. Id.
53. Id. at *6. The action for corporate negligence seems to be one of direct
negligence. Although the complaint is with the quality of care delivered by the
physician, the corporate negligence lies in the HMO's choice of participating physicians.
See supranote 13.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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result to patients if their physician choices were limited and the physicians were
unqualified or incompetent. 4
The HMO nonetheless avoided liability because Missouri had given notfor-profit "health services corporations" immunity from negligence actions and
the HMO qualified as a health service corporation. 5 Affirming, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that this grant of immunity did not violate the "open courts"
provision of the Missouri Constitution. 6 Subsequently, as part of a broader tort
immunity for not-for-profit entities, Missouri passed legislation stating that
HMOs were not practicing medicine for the purposes of tort actions against
health care providers.
Other jurisdictions have held HMOs liable for the negligence of their
physicians on the basis of agency principals" and the doctrine of respondeat
superior.9 Missouri, however, has never held an HMO vicariously liable for the
negligence of its participating providers.
IH. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In June 1997, Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan signed House Bill 335 into
law. This legislation provides for extensive regulation of HMOs and utilization
revievi providers.' This Section discusses the changes in Missouri's regulatory
scheme resulting from the recent legislation.
With House Bill 335, the General Assembly repealed prior legislation
providing HMOs immunity for tort actions based on improper care, 6' and added
HMOs to the definition of "health care provider" for tort actions against
providers. 2 The statute does not distinguish actions for direct negligence from
vicarious actions based on the negligence of a physician or other provider. The
same statutory section defines "health care services" as those services a provider
renders to a patient in the ordinary course of the provider's profession or, if the
provider is institutional, "in the ordinary course of furthering the purposes for

54. Id. at *5.

55. Id. at*8.
56. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. 1989). Mo. CONST.
art.I, § 14.
57. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.505(3) (Supp. 1997).

58. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
59. Lighterman v. Porter, 548 So. 2d 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
60. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 354.400-354.636 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
376.510-376.1399 (Supp. 1997).
61. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.505(3) (Supp. 1997)
62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.205(4) (Supp. 1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/6
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which the institution is organized."63 This latter definition may signify
legislative intent to authorize direct actions only.
The legislation also governs the quantity and quality of care an HMO
provides its enrollees in several ways. First, HMOs are prohibited from
restricting the information that providers disclose to their patients regarding the
availability of alternative treatments, the decision of a plan to authorize or deny
services, or the utilization review process of the plan." Any such "gag clauses"
in a contract between the HMO and the provider will be void. 65 Additionally,
IMOs may not prohibit a provider from advocating on behalf of enrollees within
the utilization review process.66
The legislation also contains several provisions regarding access to care.
An HMO's application for a certificate of authority from the Department of
Insurance must demonstrate that the HMO "has provided its enrollees with
adequate access to health care providers."'67
The statute defines the term "emergency medical condition" as a sudden,
unexpected health condition with symptoms "that would lead a prudent
layperson, possessing an average knowledge of health and medicine, to believe
that immediate medical care is required."68 The prudent layperson standard
prevents a managed care administrator from denying coverage based on the
findings of the visit, so long as a prudent layperson would believe that medical
care is required. The statute requires coverage for pregnant women having
contractions who believe there is inadequate time to effect transfer to another
facility before delivery.69
The legislation also requires that HMOs, as well as insurance companies,
offer coverage for treatment of recognized mental illnesses, including at least
two visits each year for the purpose of diagnosis or assessment, which cannot be
subject to pre-approval.7 This requirement applies to self-funded plans only to
the extent that such regulation is not preempted by federal law.71

63. Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.205(5) (Supp. 1997). Additionally, HMOs are subject
to regulation as utilization review agents pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 376.1350376.1390 (Supp. 1997).
64. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.441 (Supp. 1997).
65. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.441 (Supp. 1997).
66. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.606(10) (Supp. 1997).
67. Mo. REv. STAT. §354A05.3(13) (Supp. 1997). If access becomes inadequate
after the certificate of authority has been granted, the Department of Insurance may place
conditions or restrictions on the certificate of authority. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.470(1)
(Supp.1997).
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.400(5) (Supp. 1997).
69. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.400(5)(e)(a) (Supp. 1997).
70. Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.811.4 (Supp. 1997). The coverage must be subject to
the same coinsurance, copayment or deductible payments as visits for physical illnesses.
71. Mo. REv. STAT. § 376.810(5) (Supp. 1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Health carriers must now offer an open referral plan in addition to any
gatekeeper plan they offer group contract holders.72 When the employer holder
has fifty employees or less, the employer decides which plan will be used.73 For
employers with more than fifty employees, the employees decide whether they
will enroll in an open referral or gatekeeper plan.74
The managed care statute also requires carriers to implement provider
selection standards for primary care physicians as well as specialists. These
standards may not work to exclude providers who practice in geographic areas
with a high-risk or high-utilization population. 76 Nor can the standards operate
to exclude providers who specialize in treating high-risk or high-utilization
populations.
The statute also states that a "carrier shall not offer an inducement under the
managed care plan to a provider to provide less than medically necessary
services to an enrollee., 77 While the wording of the statute could be construed
to forbid capitation agreements, 78 another provision of the legislation requiring
disclosure of certain financial arrangements between HMOs and providers states
that capitation arrangements need not be disclosed.79 It therefore seems unlikely
that the quoted language will be interpreted to forbid capitation agreements.
HMOs cannot "discriminate between health care professionals when
selecting such professionals for enrollment in the network or when referring
enrollees for health care services to be provided by such health care professional
who is acting within the scope of his professional license.""n More specifically,
except for good cause, an HMO is forbidden from discriminating between
optometrists and ophthalmologists in enrollment or referral, so long as the
provider is practicing within the scope of the provider's license.8'

72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.618 (Supp. 1997). A gatekeeper plan is defined as one

in which the enrollee must obtain a referral from a primary care provider to receive care
from a specialist. Open referral plans do not require such a referral.
73. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.618.1(1) (Supp. 1997).
74. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.618.1(1) (Supp. 1997).
75. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.606.6 (Supp. 1997).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.606.6(a) (Supp. 1997).
77. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.606.9 (Supp. 1997).
78. A capitation agreement requires a provider to be responsible for the care of a
set number of enrollees. The provider receives a certain amount of compensation
regardless of how much the allotted enrollees utilize the provider's services.
79. MO. REv. STAT. § 354.443 (Supp. 1997).
80. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.606.17 (Supp. 1997).
81. Mo. REV. STAT. §354.618.5 (Supp. 1997). The legislation also provides that
the HMO must disclose descriptions of coverage, grievance procedures and utilization
review procedures to enrollees upon request. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.442 (Supp. 1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/6
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IV. DISCUSSION
The Missouri legislation's addition of HMOs to the definition of health care
provider will not achieve the desired result. While the statute authorizes suits
against HMOs, it does not distinguish between direct and vicarious claims.
Direct claims will almost certainly be preempted because even jurisdictions that
distinguish between direct and vicarious claims hold direct claims preempted.
Corcoran v. United Healthcare,Inc.,82 if followed, would hold direct claims
preempted on the grounds that Missouri's approval of such suits would subject
an ERISA plan provider to differing regulation in Missouri than in other states.
Other jurisdictions which would object to subjecting HMOs to state vicarious
liability, would not hesitate to go one step further and protect the HMO from
state direct liability. Nonetheless, insomuch as the Missouri law could be
construed to authorize claims for vicarious liability, a court may choose to follow
decisions like Corcoranand allow the vicarious claim to proceed in state court.
To the extent that other aspects of the legislation may set the standard of
care to which HMOs are subjected, the legislative goal may again be frustrated.
Assume an enrollee files suit against an HMO for its use of gag clauses in
provider contracts or on the basis of the HMO having an inadequate provider
network. The court may well characterize this direct action as one for benefits
due under an ERISA plan, and hold the claim preempted.83
Although not as likely as preemption of direct claims against HMOs, the
alterations to the structure of HMO delivery plans also may be preempted.'
These structural alterations include the prohibition of gatekeeper plans as the
exclusive delivery option," the prohibition of discrimination between health care
providers for enrollment and referral, 6 and the implementation of provider
selection criteria.
Whether structural alterations to HMOs' delivery plans will result in
preemption may turn on the treatment of the Supreme Court's decision in New
York State Conference ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield Plansv. TravelersInsurance
Co.88 Although the New York statute at issue was held not to be preempted,
Travelers has not led to a curtailment of ERISA preemption as many had
expected.89 After reviewing some of its past ERISA decisions, the Court stated

82. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
83. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
84. This would not require a direct suit against an HMO. For instance, the State
of Missouri may bring a civil enforcement action against the HMO and the HMO may
raise the defense of ERISA preemption.
85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.618 (Supp. 1997).
86. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.606.17 (Supp. 1997).
87. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.606.6 (Supp. 1997).
88. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
89. See Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr., The Travelers Decision-One Year Later-'Much
Ado About Nothing'?, 5 NO. 4 ERISA LrrG. REP. 4 (1996) ("Concern among plans and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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that "[i]n each of these cases, ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated
employee benefit structures or their administration."9 This broad language
easily could be read to call for preemption of the Missouri scheme.
Travelers also touched on the issue of structure preemption when the Court
distinguished the surcharges from substantive coverage requirements. "[T]here
might be a point at which an exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson's
choice would be treated as imposing a substantive mandate.""' The Missouri
open-referral scheme could be deemed to bind ERISA plans to a particular
choice-that of an open-referral delivery scheme whenever a gatekeeper plan is
offered-and therefore be more likely to be preempted.
Because the Missouri statute requires that all health plans offered to
employers contain an open-referral delivery system, it could be considered to
mandate the benefit structure. CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana v. Ieyoub92
would support preemption of the open-referral provision because, like
Louisiana's "any willing provider" statute, it requires ERISA plans to purchase
benefits of a particular structure. Specifically, "any willing provider" legislation
most resembles the open-referral and "non-discrimination between providers"
aspects of the Missouri plan. All three affect the relationship between the
enrollee and their physician. The first governs who can be the enrollees'
physician and the latter two dictate the situations in which enrollees can see a
specialist physician.
The efficacy of Missouri's scheme may, in the end, depend on whether a
court finds that it regulates the business of insurance.93 Some aspects of the
statute may be found to spread the policyholder's risk. The inclusion of
mandated mental health benefits almost certainly will be found to spread the
enrollee's risk of costs associated with mental health illnesses. The consequence
of other provisions, like the abolition of gag clauses and the open referral plan,
are less clear.
Whether the statute regulates an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and insured will vary from provision to provision. Again,

plan sponsors that the decision would allow states greater freedom to regulate such
programs, and thereby limit plan choices in this area. To date, these fears have not been
borne out.").
90. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658.
91. See id. at 659-60.
92. 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,Louisiana v. Cigna Healthplan of La., Inc.,
117 S. Ct. 387 (1996).
93. It is important to understand the order of the normal ERISA preemption
analysis. First, the state action must relate to an employee benefit plan. Then the issue
is whether the law regulates the business of insurance. Finally, a state cannot deem an
employee benefit plan to be an insurance plan to avoid preemption. The analysis in this
section therefore comes only after the law has been found to relate to an employee benefit
plan. See supranotes 4-6; Karen A. Jordan, ERJSA Pre-Emption:IntegratingFabe into
the Savings ClauseAnalysis, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 273 (1996).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/6
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gag clauses regulate the relationship between the insured and the provider and
between the insurer and the provider, but may not regulate an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and insured. The new definition of
"emergency medical condition" however will be found to regulate an integral
part of this relationship.
To determine whether the statute is limited to entities within the insurance
industry may depend on statutory construction. Only the requirement that
mental health coverage be offered provides a disclaimer that the statute applies
to self-funded plans only to the extent not preempted by federal law. 94 If the
statute received the benefit of the savings clause but applied to both self-funded
and traditionally-insured ERISA health plans, a court could read an exception
similar to the one for mental health benefits into the statute. To this extent, the
Missouri legislation may not achieve its intended goal because some ERISA
health plans are self-funded and beyond the reach of the savings clause.9"
V. CONCLUSION

If allowed, the Missouri plan will drastically alter the practices of managed
care entities in the state. ERISA preemption will most likely turn on the
application of the insurance savings clause exception to preemption. The issue
of ERISA preemption is important to all states that consider health care reform,
regardless of the method by which they attempt such reform. Any attempt to
alter the structure of ERISA health benefit plans that is not done with precision
and with an eye toward ERISA's broad preemptive provisions may be abortive.
The Missouri scheme is susceptible to preemption because it subjects HMOs to
liability and proscribes health benefit plans of a certain structure.
EDWARD S. STEVENS

94. See supranote 71 and accompanying text.
95. See CIGNA Healthplan of La. v. Ieyoub, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
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